The paper deals with the problem of choosing the preferable electric supply scheme of the metallurgical complex from the reliability problem of view. The algorithm of solving this problem using the logical probabilistic approach is presented. The structural, logical and probabilistic models of the system's reliability have been developed for three power supply connection options. Computational studies have been conducted, and the contributions of the elements into the reliability of the system have been determined. Aerospace Instrumentation, he has defended dissertation entitled 'Development of logical and probabilistic models, methods and algorithms for risk and efficiency management in structural complex systems'. His research interests include modelling, analysis and forecast of risk in structural-complex economics and engineering systems basing on logical and probabilistic approach.
Introduction
The reliability of structurally complex systems can be analysed both at the system operation stage and the stages of its design or reconstruction. In the former case the undesirable event probability and the possible damage scale are assessed. In the latter case the comparison of different options of the system implementation attains paramount importance, as well as the analysis of system elements importance for ensuring reliable performance.
The tasks of reliability analysis are solved successfully with the help of logical-probabilistic modelling. In this paper we deal with the problem of choosing the preferable electric supply scheme of the metallurgical complex from the reliability.
Electric supply is absolutely essential for the complex. If it is cut off totally for at least three hours the operation of the complex is stopped completely and some basic manufacturing equipment is destroyed and cannot be restored and launched again. This necessitates long and expensive capital repairs.
The management of the complex has to modernise the electric supply system due to economic considerations. Two possible connection schemes are considered in this case. The more reliable connection scheme of the electric supply of the basic manufacturing equipment has to be chosen.
The metallurgical complex gets it electric supply from two district electric power substations with the capacity of 220 and 500 kV (DEPS-1 and DEPS-2). The supply from the district substations is fed to the manufacturing equipment by three substations on the territory of the complex (EPS-1, EPS-2, EPS-3) via the switch substations system. In close vicinity to the complex is the thermal power plant (TPP-2), which can operate in the electric supply source mode and in the substation mode. Twenty-one cable lines connect the TPP-2 and the system of the complex switch substations. The electric supply scheme including district electric supply sources (GRES power plant-1 and GRES power plant-2) can be found in Figure 1 . The scheme contains the runs of overhead (OL) and cable lines (CL) which are used when assessing reliability. The arrows denote the possible cross flow directions.
The management of the complex faces the problem of excluding TPP from power supply sources and transferring it to the boiler facility mode. However, it can also consider the possibility of retaining TPP-2 as a substation for maintaining cross flow.
The aim of the present study is to compare and analyse from the reliability perspective the following schemes of connecting the complex to the external sources:
• the current connection scheme
• DEPS-1, DEPS-2, TPP-2 (as the source and as the substation)
• the proposed connection scheme, variant 1: DEPS-1, DEPS-2, TPP-2 (in boiler facility and substation modes)
• the proposed scheme, variant 2: DEPS-1, DEPS-2 (TPP-2 is excluded).
The logical-probabilistic modelling process consists of four stages (Ryabinin, 2007; Mozhaev and Gromov, 2000; Solozhentsev, 2006) .
The first stage is the comparison of the failure structural model or the system successful operation model. In fact, it represents a graph of interconnected events. The failures of any system element, or, on the contrary, its successful operation are considered to be an event.
At the second stage the logical function of the system's efficiency is built. Using logical sums, products and additions (inversions) of simple random events, it determines exactly and univalently a complex random event of the system's realisation of the predetermined operation criterion, i.e. the modelled parameter of reliability, safety or risk of the system under study.
At the third stage the logical function of system efficiency is transformed into any form, which allows us to directly calculate probability and other reliability and risk factors.
At the final fourth stage using the obtained simulation models we can calculate the factors required for solving different problems of system-related risk analysis. In particular, successful operation probability or system failure risks are calculated. The results can also be used for assessing the characteristics of the system, comparing and selecting its structural variants, optimising and synthesising systems in the process of academic research, etc.
The problem under study is typical for systems with high reservation level, which leads to repeated elements and computational complexity. It is impossible to assess and analyse the reliability of such systems without such software complexes as the Arbiter.
The construction of the reliability structural model
The structural model of the system's electric supply is presented in Figure 2 . Each element whose reliability is considered corresponds to a node with its own reference. The nodes are joined by directed arcs. Overhead and cable electric lines are denoted by squares, electric supply sources -by circles, substations -by hexagons. The resulting node Y is formed by a system of switch substations and manufacturing equipment of the complex. For considering power sources (TPP-1 and TPP-2) as a substation they are matched by two nodes X 1 and X 1 1 , X 4 and X 4 1 . The notation of system elements:
• electricity sources: X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4
• substations: X 1 1 , X 4 1 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5
• overhead and cable lines:
In the structural model the parallel power lines are joined to form a single node. For instance, reference L 3-5 means that lines L 3 , L 4 and L 4 are joined into a single node. The reduction of the nodes number reduces the number of possible system states and simplifies calculations. The reliability of two or three parallel lines is higher than that of the single one. When we build the L-model a logical variable is assigned to each node of the structural model. It can take on two values: 0 -if the element is faulty and 1 -if it is not faulty. The shortest paths of successful operation (SPSO) are determined according to this scheme. There are 15 such paths. They are described by 21 initiating events from vectors X, P, L. The logical function of the electric supply system successful operation is presented in the disjunctive normal form (DNF) ( Table 1 ). The lines are joined by logical addition -disjunction OR, аnd line elements -by logical multiplication -conjunction AND.
The L-model of the system successful operation Y can be obtained by the logical consolidation of models for
where Y 1 ,… is the L-model of the successful operation of the electric supply system using sources X 1 ,…. 
The construction of the probabilistic reliability model (P-model)
The L-model in the form of the SPSO system cannot be used directly for calculating reliability due to repeated elements. Using the 'Arbiter' software complex (Mozhaev and Gromov, 2000) , the L-model has been reduced to the orthogonal form in which L-variables are replaced with their probabilities and the P-model of system reliability is thus obtained.
The P-model of reliability contains 171 summands, each of which is the product of up to 16 multipliers ( Table 2 ). The model is too cumbersome and, therefore, only its fragment is presented here.
The calculations are performed on the P-model, substituting events probabilities, and the system reliability is assessed. If an element (a power source, a substation or a power line) is excluded, then the probability of its successful operation is set as 0.
The probabilities of system elements failures are calculated by the number of failures during a year by a chosen law of the distribution of the mean time between failures. For overhead and cable lines the number of failures is assigned by statistical data. For power sources and substations the probabilities of failures were determined by experts.
Computational studies
By setting to zero successful operation probability for a number of nodes the following results for three connection schemes were obtained (Table 2 ). In this case the failure is understood as the total power cut-off with the subsequent breakdown of the main manufacturing equipment.
Table 2
The results of assessing the reliability of connection schemes Besides calculating the reliability of the whole electric supply system with the help of the P-model, we have also calculated the contributions of system elements into reliability. The contribution into reliability shows how electric supply reliability is reduced when the source is cut off. The more it is reduced, the more important this source is for the system. The structural importance factors were also calculated for system elements. The structural importance is calculated in the same manner as the contribution into reliability. In such case the probabilities of the successful operation of all system elements are set equal to 0.5. The most significant elements from the structural point of view are selected similarly. Reliability growth of these elements gives the greatest reliability gain for the whole system.
The results for electric supply sources are presented in Table 3 . The high importance of TPP-2 is determined by its advantageous location. It is the closet one to consumers. Moreover, the number of intermediate elements is minimised. Other power stations are quite far away and are connected by long overhead power transmission lines which are among the softest spots in electric supply systems.
Conclusions
Using the logical-probabilistic approach we have analysed the electric supply system of the metallurgical complex. The structural, logical and probabilistic system reliability models were built. Using the probabilistic model we have calculated the probabilities of successful operation and failure probabilities for three possible electric supply schemes.
We have also obtained the contributions of electric supply sources into the total system reliability. TPP-2, which is in close proximity to the complex, makes the greatest contribution to reliability. Also, from the reliability point of view the current connection scheme with TPP-2 as the source is preferable.
The logical and computational complexity of the considered L-model of the metallurgical complex reliability can be compared to the well-known I.A. Ryabinin's problem no. 35 dealing with the reliability of the nuclear-powered submarine electric supply.
Noting that the LP-model shows that it is possible to build and analyse the risk LP-model of socioeconomic systems same and this greater complexity.
